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1 
 
The Conditional Spatial Correlations between Racial Prejudice and Racial Disparities in 
the Market for Home Loans 
 
Abstract 
Many studies have shown the existence of disparities in loan denial rates between blacks and 
whites that cannot be accounted for by observable applicant characteristics. Examining the link 
between racial gaps in home loan denial rates and prejudicial attitudes toward blacks measured 
by questions in the General Social Survey, this article shows that blacks are not only more likely 
to be denied conventional home mortgages but that denial rates among blacks for these loans are 
also geographically correlated with racial prejudice, particularly among first-lien home purchase 
loans and loans from depository lenders. However, among Federal Housing Administration-
insured loans guaranteed by the government in the event of borrower default, this study finds no 
evidence of a statistical relationship between racial prejudice and loan denials among black 
applicants. Results are consistent with taste-based discrimination by discriminatory lenders, 
however one cannot rule out that statistical discrimination is at least partially driving the results. 
 
Keywords: Housing, Race/Ethnicity, Real Estate, discrimination, home mortgages 
 
Introduction 
The 2008 financial crisis left many homes foreclosed on or abandoned and threatened a total 
collapse of the U.S. mortgage market. From 2006-2010 the fraction of properties foreclosed on 
nearly quadrupled and hundreds of lending institutions went bankrupt or were acquired 
(RealtyTrac Staff, 2011). In the wake of the crisis, lenders have been increasingly selective. 
Many require higher credit scores and larger down payments for conventional mortgages and it is 
more difficult to refinance one’s home or adjust an existing mortgage (Appelbaum, 2012; 
Palmer, n.d.). The Urban Institute estimates that lenders forwent 6.3 million mortgage loans from 
2009-2015 that would have been provided under more ordinary lending circumstances 
(Goodman et al., 2016b).  
In the current lending environment discrimination may make it even more difficult for 
minorities to secure home financing. However, there is debate about the existence of lender 
discrimination in the mortgage market since it is unclear whether higher denial rates for 
minorities are driven by market forces or taste-based discrimination. Additionally, the majority 
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of past studies finding disparities in denial rates between whites and minorities omit important 
explanatory variables such as credit history, wealth, and debt burden that may be important in the 
lending decision (Black et al., 1978; King, 1980; Schafer and Ladd, 1981; Maddala and Trost, 
1982; Canner and Gabriel, 1992). Since minorities have more undesirable credit histories and 
less wealth than whites on average, failure to control for these variables has resulted in stronger 
estimated relationships between denial rates and applicant race (Munnell et al., 1996).  
This article focuses on the spatial relationship between black-white mortgage denial rate 
disparities and an index measuring racial prejudice toward blacks. The analysis shows racial 
denial rate disparities in the conventional market are largest in counties where racial prejudice is 
greatest conditional on observable individual- and county-level characteristics including county-
level differences in wealth and creditworthiness. It may be difficult to interpret these conditional 
correlations as proof of discrimination since racial prejudice is not randomly assigned and 
important individual-level characteristics such as wealth and credit history are unobserved. 
However, this study contributes to the literature by providing the first empirical evidence that 
mortgage denial disparities are spatially correlated with racial prejudice conditional on all 
individual- and county-level characteristics that can be observed.  
 
Discussion and Related Literature 
Central to the study of lender discrimination in the mortgage market is the difference 
between statistical and taste-based discrimination. Statistical discrimination is driven by profit-
seeking, possibly unprejudiced, lenders who use race to proxy for the unobservable 
characteristics of a group (Arrow, 1973). On the other hand, taste-based discrimination is 
prejudicial in nature and should result in lower profits for lenders who engage in it (Becker, 
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1957). The finding that denial rates are higher for blacks than for whites could be consistent with 
statistical discrimination if loans to blacks are riskier. 
Previous studies have found evidence of discrimination in the mortgage market by studying 
differences in denial rates between blacks and whites (Black et al., 1978; King, 1980; Schafer 
and Ladd, 1981; Maddala and Trost, 1982; Canner and Gabriel, 1992; Munnell et al., 1996). 
However, these studies are unable to determine whether differences in denial rates result from 
statistical or taste-based discrimination and most omit key determinants of loan denials.  
In an effort to overcome limitations in Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data, 
namely the omission of variables such as applicant wealth and credit history, members of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston collected additional information from mortgage applicants in 
the Boston area (Munnell et al. 1996). After controlling for these additional characteristics, 
Munnell et al. (1996) found that minority applicants continued to have higher denial probabilities 
than whites though inclusion of the additional characteristics substantially attenuated the gap. A 
number of other studies have used data from the Boston Fed Study in support of these findings 
(Carr and Megbolugbe, 1993; Browne and Tootel, 1995; Glennon and Stengel, 1995; Tootel, 
1996). 
Critics of the Boston Fed study argue that denial rate disparities between whites and 
minorities do not prove the existence of discrimination if loans to minorities are riskier (Becker, 
1993; Brimelow, 1993; Brimelow and Spencer, 1993; Roberts, 1993); however, it is worth 
noting this would constitute statistical discrimination. Theoretically, if lenders use taste-based 
discrimination to set higher credit cutoffs for black applicants, then the marginal black borrower 
should be more creditworthy than the marginal white borrower. Using this justification, 
researchers have attempted to rule out discrimination in the lending market by showing that 
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blacks have higher – not lower –default rates (Van Order et al., 1993; Berkovec et al., 1994, 
1996). There are a couple major problems with these studies of loan performance: they (1) 
compare average, not marginal, black and white borrowers, and (2) fail to include factors such as 
credit history that may be negatively correlated with minority status and default rates.
 1,2,3 
 
This study adds to the existing literature by providing the first evidence that blacks not only 
have higher conditional mortgage denial rates, but also that conventional loan denial disparities 
are geographically correlated with racial prejudice conditional on all individual- and county-level 
characteristics that can be observed. 
 
Data 
The data used in this study come primarily from the 1993-2008 General Social Survey (GSS) 
and 2009-2015 HMDA. Additionally, the study supplements these sources with data from the 
2006-2010 American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year Estimates, 2008 Federal Reserve 
Economic Data (FRED), 2004 and 2008 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), 
2010 Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Neighborhood Stabilization Program 
(HUDNSP3), and 2010 Environmental Systems Research Institute (ESRI) Home Affordability 
Index. Due to data limitations, the analysis is limited to a 189 county sampling frame for which 
                                                 
1
 Other studies have found evidence of redlining in loan originations (Bradbury et al., 1989), loan rejections 
(Dedman, 1988), the types of creditors in the market (Avery and Buynak, 1981), and the types of loans used to 
finance home purchases (Gabriel and Rosenthal, 1991). However, studies controlling for applicant characteristics 
generally conclude that individuals in minority neighborhoods are no less likely to be granted loans (Bentson et al., 
1978; Schafer and Ladd, 1981; Schill and Wachter, 1993) or use conventional financing when purchasing a home 
(Canner et al., 1991). Additionally, Tootel (1996) finds that lenders do not appear to be redlining neighborhoods 
based on racial composition or average income, but instead deny loans to minorities with a higher frequency 
regardless of neighborhood characteristics. However, Ross and Tootel (2004) conclude that lenders are withholding 
home loans from individuals in certain neighborhoods for those who do not purchase private mortgage insurance.  
2
 More recently, Hansen et al. (2016) use a field experiment to show that lenders are less likely to respond to or send 
follow-up emails to inquiries from blacks – a response effect equivalent to having a credit score 71 points lower. In a 
follow-up they further show that blacks are more likely to obtain subprime loans when borrowing from lenders more 
responsive to them (Hansen et al., 2017). 
3
 For a more extensive treatment of the housing market discrimination literature see Goering and Wienk (1996), 
Ladd (1998), and Ross and Yinger (2002).  
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county-level estimates pertaining to racial prejudice, racial demographic gaps, and state-level 
wealth gaps for metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas could be estimated concurrently; more 
information is discussed below.
4
 This 189 county sampling frame covers 41.4% of the U.S. 
population and 39.9% of housing units. The years for which data are used were selected to 
maximize the accuracy of the covariates while minimizing the extent of reverse causality 
whereby racial denial gaps could impact independent variables in the model.  
 
GSS Sensitive Data Files 
This study measures racial prejudice across counties using the GSS Sensitive Data Files 
consisting of responses to demographic, behavioral, and attitudinal questions for each individual 
and containing county-level geographic identifiers.
5
 In each year, the survey contains an 
independently drawn sample of roughly 2,000-3,000 English or Spanish speaking persons 18 
years of age or over living in non-institutional arrangements within the U.S. GSS data are 
designed to be representative at the primary sampling unit (PSU) level, with each PSU being 
either a metropolitan area consisting of one or more counties or a single nonmetropolitan county 
(NORC, 2017).
6
 In order to measure prejudicial attitudes across counties survey results from 
1993-2008 are pooled, as representativeness should improve by pooling additional years of the 
                                                 
4
 There are 224 counties in the GSS consisting of at least 25 sampled white individuals. Of these 224 counties, there 
are 23 where racial demographic gaps in the ACS cannot be estimated, 10 where racial wealth gaps from SIPP 
cannot be estimated, and 2 where conditional denial gaps from HMDA cannot be estimated.  
5
 Some of the data used in this analysis are derived from Sensitive Data Files of the GSS, obtained under special 
contractual arrangements designed to protect the anonymity of respondents. These are restricted-access data files 
maintained by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago. These data are not available from 
the author. Persons interested in obtaining GSS Sensitive Data Files should contact the GSS at GSS@NORC.org. 
6
 Segments within PSUs are first sorted with regard to state, place, percent minority, census tract, and whether they 
fall within the central city, and then sampled proportional to the number of housing units contained within (NORC, 
2017). 
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GSS due to the addition of decade-specific sampling frames and more individual observations 
each year (NORC, 2017).
7
 
The GSS asks many questions focused on determining white individuals’ attitudes toward 
blacks. However, many questions include components not directly related to racial prejudice, 
such as feelings about government assistance for blacks or affirmative action. Including only 
questions that one-dimensionally focus on attitudes toward blacks, a racial prejudice index is 
compiled for each white individual. The study then estimates the average prejudice of whites 
towards blacks in each county by estimating the pooled average of the racial prejudice index 
across the 1993-2008 surveys. The analysis is limited to counties where at least 25 white 
respondents are sampled from 1993-2008 in order to exclude counties where average white 
prejudice cannot be accurately estimated. Similar indices have been used to show that taste-based 
racial prejudice is conditionally correlated with wages (Charles and Guryan, 2008) and business 
ownership (Kopkin, 2017). For more details on the calculation of the index used in this article, 
see the Supplemental Appendix. 
 
HMDA Data 
Given sufficient credit, a homebuyer generally has the option of financing a home purchase 
with either a conventional or FHA-insured loan.
8
 Conventional loans are generally intended for 
homebuyers with decent credit and income and enough savings to support down payment 
requirements of 5%-20% of the purchase price. According to John Councilman, federal housing 
                                                 
7
 Due to data limitations, this study is only able to include census tracts from the 1993, 1994, and 1996 waves in the 
1990s sampling frame that can be matched to primary sampling unit segments in the 1998-2004 waves since census 
tracts were unreported prior to 1998. 
8
 Conventional and FHA-insured loans comprised 77.0% and 16.1% of the mortgage market from 2009-2015. The 
remaining 6.9% is comprised of Veterans Administration-guaranteed, Farm Service Agency, or Rural Housing 
Service-guaranteed loans available to individuals meeting specialized criteria. 
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chairman for the National Association of Mortgage Brokers, in the current climate only 
individuals with credit scores above 620 should expect to succeed in acquiring conventional 
mortgages and those with scores below 740 should expect to be charged exceptionally higher 
interest rates (Santiago, n.d.). 
FHA-insured loans on the other hand are generally targeted at moderate to low income 
homebuyers who cannot meet credit score or down payment requirements for conventional 
loans. These loans are backed by the FHA in the event of borrower default but are granted by 
independent lenders. The FHA generally places lower credit score and down payment 
requirements on these loans than on comparable conventional loans though lenders may set 
higher requirements if they choose. Additionally, FHA-insured loans may sometimes offer lower 
interest rates than comparable conventional loans but include an annual mortgage insurance 
premium and an upfront fee (which may be financed into the loan) to pay for the FHA-provided 
mortgage insurance (Da Costa, 2011). According to Brian Gould, Chief Operating Officer for 
private mortgage insurance firm United Guaranty, “a conventional loan generally is less 
expensive” (Da Costa, 2013). However, an analysis by the Urban Institute shows FHA loans may 
be a lower-cost option than conventional loans with private mortgage insurance for individuals 
with minimal down payments and low credit scores (Goodman et al., 2016a). In the aftermath of 
the housing crisis subprime lending has largely ceased and FHA loans now account for a much 
larger fraction of home purchase and refinancing loans made to blacks, raising serious concerns 
about racial steering into FHA loans (Furman Center, 2010).  
HMDA was enacted into U.S. law in 1975, requiring covered financial institutions to 
“maintain, report, and publically disclose” information pertaining to home mortgages (Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau, 2017). These data were requested to help lenders better serve their 
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communities’ housing needs, aid policymakers, and help uncover discriminatory lending 
practices (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 2017). HMDA consists of data from all 
covered financial institutions in response to applications, originations, and purchases of home 
loans in each calendar year and contains over 112 million observations from 2009-2015. These 
data cover home purchase, refinancing, and home-improvement loans and include many 
applicant, loan, and property characteristics. These characteristics include the race, ethnicity, 
gender, and income of the applicant and co-applicant, the loan amount and type, information 
about the property and location (census tract identifiers), and the action taken by the financial 
institution. In HMDA, a loan application is either originated, approved but not accepted, denied 
by the financial institution, withdrawn by the applicant, or closed for incompleteness. This study 
defines a loan as approved if it is either originated or approved but not accepted and defines a 
loan as denied if it is denied by the lender; loan applications withdrawn by the applicant or 
closed for incompleteness are disregarded. This study includes in its primary analysis the 19.5 
million observations within the 189 county sampling frame where the applicant and co-applicant 
are both either non-Hispanic black or non-Hispanic white of the same race.
9,10,11,12 
 
                                                 
9
 While there are over 112 million loans in HMDA over this period, over 20 million of these were purchases by 
financial institutions on the secondary market, and over 14 million were either pre-approval requests, were closed 
due to incompleteness, or were withdrawn by the applicant; this leaves 77.9 million loans that were either approved 
or denied. Of these, 8.5 million were mail, telephone, or internet applications that do not contain race information. 
All in-house applications contain race information. If an applicant does not volunteer their race or ethnicity, the loan 
officer is supposed to make a determination on her own accord. Lenders failing to follow correct procedure may 
incorrectly list race, gender, or ethnicity as ‘not applicable.’ It is unclear what impact this may have on HMDA 
analysis. Of the 68.6 million loan applications including race and ethnicity, 55.7 million represent applicants who 
are non-Hispanic and either Black or White alone. An additional 1.3 million observations omit income because 
income is not required for multifamily units or when not considered in the loan decision. Of the remaining 
observations, 19.5 million are in the 189 county sampling frame. 
10
 While there is information on preapproval requests denied or accepted, preapproval denial analysis is not possible 
because reporting for acceptances is optional.  
11
 HMDA also provides information on loan purchases by financial institutions on the secondary market; this study 
does not make use of these observations.  
12
 Because HMDA has been used in litigation resulting in the payment of fines, to avoid reporting loan denials to 
minorities there is incentive for lenders to dissuade less-qualified minority applicants from completing applications. 
Such behavior could understate conditional correlations between loan denial rates and racial prejudice if prospective 
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Panel A of Table 1 summarizes HMDA loan applications by race for the primary sample. It 
shows that 18.6% of loans applied for by whites were denied and 39.1% of loans applied for by 
blacks were denied; these rates compare with national denial rates of 19.8% and 39.9%. 
Additionally, the table shows white applicants apply for larger loans, have higher gross income, 
are less likely to be female, and are more likely to have co-applicants than blacks. Furthermore, 
the table shows blacks are more likely to apply for home purchase or home improvement loans 
and less likely to apply for refinancing loans than whites; blacks are also more likely to seek 
second mortgages and less likely to use conventional home financing. 
 
Other Data 
This study supplements the GSS and HMDA with county-level demographic data from the 
2006-2010 ACS 5-year Estimates, 2008 county-level subprime credit data from FRED, state-
level metropolitan and nonmetropolitan area wealth data from the SIPP 2004 Wave 6 and 2008 
Wave 4, tract-based racial delinquency gap estimates from HUDNSP3, and the 2010 Home 
Affordability Index published by ESRI. From the 2006-2010 ACS, the study makes use of 
county-level data on the fraction of blacks and whites with at least a bachelor’s degree, the 
fraction of blacks and whites unemployed, and the fraction of blacks and whites self-employed; 
it also makes use of the fraction of the population that is black and the population density in each 
county. Some counties consist of too few black observations for the ACS to publically disclose 
an estimate; for these counties the study is unable to compute racial demographic gaps. 
The study includes data from FRED over the four quarters of 2008 on the percentage in each 
county with subprime credit. Unfortunately, race-specific data on the subprime credit population 
                                                                                                                                                             
minority applicants are observably similar to qualified white applicants and the behavior is correlated with racial 
prejudice. 
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in each county is unavailable. However, by including an interaction term between the percentage 
with subprime credit and the fraction black, the study is able to flexibly allow the conditional 
correlation between denial rates and the percentage with subprime credit to vary linearly with the 
fraction black in each county. Additionally, the study uses SIPP to uncover state-level 
metropolitan and nonmetropolitan area estimates of net assets per capita for blacks and whites. 
To do so, wave 6 of the 2004 SIPP (collected in late 2005 to early 2006) is merged with wave 4 
of the 2008 SIPP (collected in early 2010); merging data from multiple samples helps ensure the 
aggregated sample is not biased. Unfortunately, the finest level of geography available in the 
SIPP is state within either metropolitan or nonmetropolitan areas. Because the SIPP does not 
contain more detailed geographic information, the analysis is forced to operate under the 
assumption that the average wealth gap is homogeneous across all metropolitan counties and 
across all nonmetropolitan counties within a state. While the assumption is not ideal this is the 
best available estimate of the racial wealth gap. 
From HUDNSP3, the study estimates a tract-based county-level racial delinquency gap. To 
do so, it first determines the fraction of the race-specific county population living in each tract. 
Then, by assuming the average delinquency rate for each racial group in a tract is the same as the 
overall average delinquency rate in the tract, the study calculates a weighted average for each 
racial group over all tracts in each county. Therefore, the estimate of the racial gap provided in 
each county is the result of racial location differences within county and likely underestimates 
true differences in delinquency rates within county. However, this is the best available estimate 
of the race-specific county-level delinquency gap. Lastly, the study includes the 2010 Home 
Affordability Index published by ESRI. As a guide, the Supplemental Appendix lists the source 
of each variable used in the analysis in Table A1 and provides additional rationale for the use of 
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the specific years of data chosen for analysis. Panels B and C of Table 1 provide county-level 
estimates of conditional black-white denial gaps and county-level covariates used in the analysis 
that follows.  
 
Methodology 
The aim of this study is to test whether racial denial disparities are geographically correlated 
with racial prejudice. Studies such as Munnell et al. (1996) show that disparities in loan denial 
rates between blacks and whites exist conditional on observable applicant, loan, property, and 
neighborhood characteristics. This study augments previous analysis by showing that conditional 
loan denial gaps are geographically correlated with racial prejudice controlling for observable 
county-level differences in creditworthiness, wealth, unemployment, education, and other 
demographic differences between blacks and whites. 
In the first step of the analysis, the study estimates a separate regression for each county of 
whether a loan applicant is denied her loan on an indicator variable that takes a 1 if the applicant 
is black and a 0 otherwise. Each regression includes control variables for the applicant’s income-
to-loan ratio, the loan amount, the gender of the applicant and co-applicant, the property type, the 
purpose of loan, the loan type, information on occupancy and lien status, and census tract and 
lender fixed effects.
13
 Additionally, each regression includes the ratio of the loan-to-median 
housing value using race-specific county-level ACS data on the median value of owner-occupied 
units. Formally, the study estimates the following regression for each county:  
      	() = 1 =   + () + () + () +	 !()+"#() + ∑%	() + ∑&() +∑'() + (	() ),      (1)  
                                                 
13
 Lender fixed effects can explain significant racial differences in loan denial rates (Munnell et al., 1996; Ross and 
Yinger, 2002) and loan pricing (Bayer et al., 2014; Bhutta and Ringo, 2014). 
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where  is equal to 1 if applicant i and co-applicant  who apply for loan 	on property + in 
census tract , in year - in county j are denied the loan,  is an individual-specific indicator 
variable equal to 1 if applicant i in county j is black and equal to 0 if i is white,  is a vector of 
applicant characteristics including gender and the income-to-loan ratio, and  is a vector of co-
applicant characteristics. Additionally, each regression includes !, a vector of loan 
characteristics, #, a vector of property characteristics, %, year fixed effects, &, census tract fixed 
effects, and ', lender fixed effects; ( is an error term. When f is a linear function,  is the 
county-specific black-white denial rate gap controlling for observable applicant, loan, and, 
property characteristics. 
In the second step of the analysis, the study estimates a regression of county-level gaps in 
loan denials on the average prejudice of whites in each county. Specifically, the study estimates 
the following regression:  
                        ./ =	0	+	0123 	+ 	04 	+ 	5 ,            (2)    
where 6  is the estimated county-level loan denial gap between blacks and whites from 
estimation of equation (1), 123	is the average prejudice of whites in county j, 4	is a vector of 
county-level characteristics, and 5 is a county-level error term. The vector 4 includes all 
variables shown in Panel C of Table 1 aside from the index of prejudicial attitudes labeled Avg. 
White Prejudice. 
Identification of the coefficient 0 in equation (2) is based on the covariance between the 
county-level loan denial gap and the average prejudice of whites in those counties conditional on 
the county-specific characteristics in	4. 1000 can be interpreted as the percentage point increase 
in the racial denial gap associated with a one standard deviation increase in the average prejudice 
of whites within a county. This estimate controls for all observable applicant, co-applicant, loan, 
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property, lender, and census tract characteristics and those characteristics observable at the 
county level. Note that performing the analysis in two steps is equivalent to performing the 
analysis in a single step with county and census tract fixed effects, county-specific coefficients 
for each individual-level characteristic, and interactions between the black indicator variable and 
each county-level variable. However, by performing the estimation in two steps the study is able 
to more easily compute coefficient estimates from over 20 million HMDA observations, more 
accurately estimate standard errors that account for both county-level clustering and imprecision 
in the prejudice index, and display county-level coefficients with a more simplistic interpretation. 
For more information on two-stage feasible generalized least squares estimation, see Borjas 
(1982), Hanushek (1974), Lewis and Linzer (2005) and Leoni (2009).
14,15
 
 
Results 
In this section, the study first shows correlations between racial denial gaps and racial 
prejudice in the conventional and FHA loan markets conditional on observable applicant, 
property, and loan characteristics available in HMDA and county-level data from other sources. 
The study then extends this analysis to more segmented markets: conventional and FHA first-
lien home purchase markets, conventional and FHA refinancing markets, and conventional 
lending from depository institutions and non-depository institutions regulated by HUD. Lastly, 
the study notes potential biases and provides suggestive evidence that these biases are unlikely 
driving the results based on an analysis of observable county-level characteristics. 
                                                 
14
 A non-linear binary model such as a logit or probit could be used to estimate equation (1), however the estimate of 
the coefficient 0 in equation (2) would be difficult to interpret. For ease of interpretation, this study uses a linear 
probability model to estimate equation (1).  
15
 See the Supplemental Index for a note on the methodology used to estimate standard errors. 
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Column 1 of Table 2 shows estimates from the county-level regression of the conditional 
racial denial gap in the conventional market on the index of racial prejudice. A one standard 
deviation increase in average white prejudice is associated with a 1.07 percentage point increase 
in the racial denial gap that is statistically significant at the 5% level. Racial gaps in 
unemployment and self-employment are significantly correlated with the racial denial gap at the 
1% level suggesting that a one percentage point increase in the black-white unemployment gap is 
associated with a 0.91 percentage point increase in the racial denial gap and a one percentage 
point increase in the black-white self-employment gap is associated with a 0.61 percentage point 
increase in the racial denial gap. Additionally, the racial denial gap is conditionally correlated 
with home affordability at the 0.1% level suggesting that the racial denial gap is greater in 
counties with more affordable housing. Supplemental Appendix Table A4 shows that the 
coefficient of interest in the conventional market specification shown is relatively robust to the 
inclusion or exclusion of controls for racial gaps in education, wealth, unemployment, 
delinquencies, etc., as the bivariate correlation remains relatively unchanged after the inclusion 
of the full set of controls.
16
  
To understand the magnitude of the conditional correlation between the racial denial gap in 
the conventional market and racial prejudice, the analysis relates the coefficient estimate on 
racial prejudice in the conventional market to the difference in the average amount of racial 
prejudice and the average racial denial gap in the conventional market across quartiles of the 
county-level distribution of racial prejudice. This analysis shows that racial prejudice accounts 
                                                 
16
 The analysis excludes a measure of segregation as a county-level covariate because segregation may be 
endogenously determined if lenders in more racially prejudiced counties are more likely to deny loans from black 
applicants in largely-white census tracts. However, substantively similar conclusions can be drawn including the 
black-white dissimilarity index over census tracts, a widely used measure of segregation. For more details, see the 
Supplemental Appendix and Supplemental Appendix Table A5. 
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for 2.65 percentage points of the average racial denial gap difference in the conventional market 
(approximately 61% of the gap) between counties in the least and most prejudiced quartiles. 
The estimate in column 1 of Table 2, showing the conditional correlation between racial 
prejudice and the racial denial gap in the conventional market, can be directly compared to the 
estimate in column 2 showing no statistical relationship between racial prejudice and the black-
white denial gap in the FHA-insured market: the coefficient on average white prejudice in 
column 2 is less than one-fifth the size of the estimate in the conventional market and is 
statistically insignificant. If no relationship exists between the racial denial gap in the FHA 
market and racial prejudice it may be because greater government oversight in the FHA market 
makes it more costly for lenders to discriminate for fear of fair lending litigation. Additionally, 
because FHA-insured loans generally have more standardized terms than conventional loans it 
may be easier for government agencies to use HMDA to uncover evidence of discrimination at 
the bank level. However, this study finds a large albeit statistically insignificant relationship 
between the racial denial gap in the FHA first-lien home purchase market and racial prejudice. 
Therefore, it is unclear if there is actually no relationship in the FHA market or if there is simply 
not enough power to uncover the relationship. 
Estimates in columns 3 and 4 show conditional correlations between racial prejudice and 
racial denial gaps in the conventional and FHA first-lien home purchase markets. The estimate of 
the conditional correlation between racial prejudice and the racial denial gap in the conventional 
first-lien home purchase market is somewhat more pronounced than the estimate in the 
conventional market as a whole and is statistically significant at the 5% level. The estimate in the 
FHA first-lien home purchase market, though statistically insignificant, is even more pronounced 
than the estimate in the conventional first-lien home purchase market. 
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Estimates in columns 5 and 6 show conditional correlations between racial prejudice and 
racial denial gaps in the conventional and FHA refinancing markets. The estimate of the 
conditional correlation in the conventional refinancing market is somewhat smaller than the 
estimate in the conventional market as a whole and the conditional correlation in the FHA 
refinancing market is essentially zero; neither is statistically significant. Estimates in columns 7 
and 8 further examine conventional loans by depository institutions and non-depository 
institutions covered by HUD. The estimate of interest is large and statistically significant at the 
5% level for conventional loans by depository institutions but is negative and statistically 
insignificant for conventional loans by non-depository institutions.
17,18
  
An extension of the analysis, provided in Supplemental Appendix Table A6, shows the 
fraction of the conditional racial denial gap that can be attributed to racial prejudice between the 
1
st
 and 2
nd
 quartile, 1
st
 and 3
rd
 quartile, and 1
st
 and 4
th
 quartile of the prejudice distribution 
separately by market type based on coefficients in Table 2. Furthermore, Supplemental Appendix 
Table A8 provides estimates of the conditional relationship between racial prejudice and racial 
gaps in the prevalence of high-priced loans, providing additional evidence that racial prejudice 
has a statistical impact in the conventional market. 
 
                                                 
17
 Exceptionally tight credit in the current environment has been partially tied to concerns about mortgage put-backs 
from government-sponsored enterprises or the FHA (Goodman et al., 2016b). Concern about put-backs is 
particularly large for high loan-to-value loans to low credit borrowers. While put-back risk may affect the magnitude 
of the conditional correlations between racial denial gaps and racial prejudice in conventional markets it is 
particularly relevant to FHA markets. Despite the fact that conditional correlations between racial denial gaps and 
racial prejudice in all observed FHA markets is statistically insignificant, put-back risk may be one driver of the 
relatively large estimate found in the FHA first-lien home purchase market. However, the magnitude of the impact 
of put-back risk ultimately depends on the distribution of creditworthiness among black and white applicants. 
18
 One potential criticism of the primary analysis is that the county-level prejudice index is estimated using the 
distribution of all whites in each county but lenders are the only individuals whose tastes for discrimination 
influence the lending decision. Thus, to more accurately assess the impact of ‘lender’ prejudice, the study reweights 
the sample from the GSS by the propensity to work in a managerial occupation in a banking, savings, and loan 
organization. Adjusting the prejudice index in this manner provides substantively similar results. For more 
information refer to the Supplemental Index and Supplemental Index Table A7. 
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Potential Biases 
Because the conditional correlation between racial prejudice and the racial denial gap is 
statistically significant in the conventional market but not the FHA market, it is possible that the 
marginal black applicant might opt for FHA-based home financing in more prejudiced counties 
to circumvent taste-based discrimination in the conventional market. Additionally, it is possible 
that lenders in more prejudiced counties might be more likely to steer black applicants toward 
FHA loans. If black applicants whose conventional loans would be accepted in the absence of 
prejudice choose to instead apply for FHA-insured loans in more prejudiced counties, perhaps 
because lenders steer them toward these loans, then estimates presented may understate the 
conditional correlation between racial prejudice and the racial denial gap in the conventional 
market. In this vein, this study explores how racial prejudice is correlated with the likelihood of 
applying for FHA-based financing. Table 3 shows that there is no statistical relationship between 
racial prejudice and the probability that blacks apply for FHA-insured loans instead of 
conventional loans. While this analysis provides no evidence of selection into the FHA-insured 
market for the average black applicant, it does not necessarily preclude the possibility that some 
marginal black applicants do self-select into the FHA-insured market or finance homes using 
other methods, cash payment upfront for example.  
Another potential issue in the analysis is that unobservable characteristics of black applicants 
may be negatively correlated with racial prejudice. If black applicants in more prejudiced 
counties are lower quality applicants in ways unobservable to the researcher, then conditional 
correlations between racial denial gaps and racial prejudice may be overstated. However, there is 
also reason to believe that black applicants in more prejudiced counties would be more likely to 
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avoid applying for a loan (or apply for a smaller loan) if they believe they will be discriminated 
against or if steered from applying by a racially prejudiced lender.  
In an effort to explore these issues, the study next considers how the observable 
characteristics of blacks in each county are correlated with racial prejudice. Table 4 shows 
bivariate regressions of county-level racial gaps in the income-to-loan ratio and log income of 
applicants in the conventional and FHA-insured markets against the average prejudice of whites 
in each county. In addition, among the entire population, the table shows how county-level gaps 
in the fraction with a bachelor’s degree, the unemployment rate, the self-employment rate, 
wealth, delinquency, the percent owning their home free and clear, and the percent with housing 
costs exceeding 35% of income are correlated with racial prejudice. All bivariate correlations 
aside from the correlation between racial prejudice and the bachelor’s degree gap are statistically 
insignificant and the correlation between racial prejudice and the bachelor’s degree gap takes the 
opposite sign expected. Lack of statistical significance does not formally prove there are no 
relationships between racial prejudice and other covariates as it may be the case that there is not 
enough power to uncover the relationships. Nonetheless, if racial gaps in the income-to-loan 
ratio and log income of applicants are uncorrelated with racial prejudice then any omitted 
variable can only be correlated with prejudice if the part of the unobservable correlated with 
prejudice is uncorrelated with both of these variables. 
On the whole, evidence shows no observable bias in the quality of black conventional loan 
applicants. What cannot be known, however, is how the individual wealth and credit histories of 
black applicants compare to observably comparable white applicants; if black applicants have 
lower wealth and poorer credit than can be explained with observable county-level differences 
and these omitted variables are correlated with racial prejudice, then these unobservable 
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characteristics may explain part of the racial difference in denial rates across counties attributed 
in the model to racial prejudice.  
 
Conclusion 
Many studies have shown the existence of disparities in loan denial rates between blacks and 
whites that cannot be explained by observable characteristics. In contrast, this study examines 
the link between these conditional racial denial gaps and prejudicial attitudes toward blacks. 
Findings show that an increase in the average prejudice of whites at the county level is 
conditionally correlated with a widening in the black-white denial rate gap in the conventional 
market. Separately examining the conventional first-lien home purchase market and the 
conventional refinancing market, the study finds that the conditional correlation between racial 
prejudice and the racial denial gap is relatively large in both markets though statistically 
insignificant in the conventional refinancing market. Splitting the sample by depository and non-
depository lenders, the study further shows that the conditional correlation between racial 
prejudice and the racial denial gap is large and statistically significant among depository 
institutions but negligible and statistically insignificant among non-depository institutions. 
In contrast to findings in the conventional market, the study finds no evidence of statistical 
relationships between racial prejudice and racial denial gaps in the FHA-insured market. On the 
whole, details presented in this article provide evidence that racial denial gaps in the 
conventional market, particularly in the first-lien home purchase market, are conditionally 
spatially correlated with racial prejudice such that blacks are more likely denied home financing 
in more prejudiced counties.  
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Provided that racial prejudice is having an adverse impact on the ability of blacks to obtain 
home loans, many blacks are being wrongfully kept from achieving positive outcomes associated 
with homeownership regardless of ability to pay. Such behavior by lenders has negative 
implications for wealth creation, income tax benefits (mortgage interest and property tax 
deductions, preferential treatment of gains at sale), and emotional satisfaction for blacks. If racial 
prejudice is partially responsible for the existence of racial denial gaps, policies targeted at 
reducing racial prejudice could improve home loan outcomes for blacks. Such policies could 
include reducing barriers to outside competition in particularly prejudiced jurisdictions or 
implementing stricter enforcement of anti-discrimination laws in jurisdictions where racial 
prejudice is prevalent.  
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_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Black White Black White__________ __________ __________________
Denied 0.3909 0.1855 Refinancing Loan 0.5304 0.6262
(0.4880) (0.3887) (0.4991) (0.4838)
Loan Amount 146,237.30 194,013.70 Owner-Occupied 0.9229 0.9061
(130,814.20) ( 187809.40) (0.2668) (0.2916)
Gross Income 71,771.33 107,044.90 Secured by First Lien 0.8973 0.9488
(105,922.40) (155,117.00) (0.3036) (0.2204)
Female Applicant 0.4679 0.2740 Conventional Loan 0.5733 0.7926
(0.4990) (0.4460) (0.4946) (0.4054)
Co-applicant Present 0.2572 0.5275 FHA Loan 0.3028 0.1442
(0.4371) (0.4992) (0.4595) (0.3513)
Home Purchase Loan 0.3549 0.3147 Single Family Home 0.9571 0.9692
(0.4785) (0.4644) (0.2027) (0.1727)
Home Improvement Loan 0.1147 0.0591 Preapproval Requested 0.0235 0.0219
(0.3187) (0.2358) (0.1515) (0.1465)
Number of Observations 1,554,616 19,476,140___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
All Conventional Loans 0.1463 Conventional Refinance Loans 0.1329
(0.0683) (0.1016)
All FHA Loans 0.0804 FHA Refinance Loans 0.1349
(0.1471) (0.3536)
Conventional First Lien Purchase Loans 0.1320 Conventional HUD Loans 0.0378
(0.0932) (1.2037)
FHA First Lien Purchase Loans 0.0810 Conventional Non-HUD Loans 0.1522
(0.2388) (0.0726)___________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Avg. White Prejudice 2.3334 Delinquency Gap 2.2554
(1.0000) (2.1593)
Fraction Black 0.1301 Owned Free/Clear Gap -10.3529
(0.1257) (9.6836)
Log Population Density 6.2169 Housing Costs Exceed 35% Gap 12.8963
(1.4912) (9.8632)
Bachelor's Degree Gap -14.8032 Home Affordability Index 161.7349
(9.6623) (48.2393)
Unemployment Gap -6.2240 Central Metropolitan County 0.7937
(1.4865) (0.4058)
Self-Employment Gap -2.8941 Outlying Metropolitan County 0.0741
(2.8645) (0.2626)
Percent Subprime Credit 32.3949 Micropolitan County 0.1005
(7.3738) (0.3015)
Table 1  Summary Statistics
Panel A. In-Sample Individual-Level Statistics from 2009-2015 HMDA
Panel B. In-Sample County-Level Conditional Black-White Denial Gaps
Panel C. In-Sample County-Level Covariates
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____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Conv. FHA
All All First Lien First Lien Conv. FHA Conv. Conv.
Conv. FHA Purchase Purchase Refinance Refinance HUD Non-HUD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________-
Avg. White Prejudice 0.0107* 0.0020 0.0132* 0.0156 0.0090 -0.0001 -0.0013 0.0107*
(0.0044) (0.0071) (0.0052) (0.0138) (0.0061) (0.0199) (0.0361) (0.0049)
Fraction Black 0.2290 0.0058 0.1690 -0.3080 0.5610 0.1210 -0.7290 0.2610
(0.1960) (0.3480) (0.2350) (0.6410) (0.310) (1.3090) (1.5660) (0.220)
Log Population Density 0.0007 0.0078 -2.65e-05 0.0212 -0.0033 0.0323 -0.0114 0.0004
(0.0044) (0.0077) (0.0050) (0.0109) (0.0058) (0.0291) (0.0365) (0.0048)
Bachelor's Degree Gap -0.0007 0.0007 3.40e-05 0.0011 2.95e-05 0.0006 -0.0058 -0.0010
(0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0017) (0.0010) (0.0030) (0.0084) (0.0007)
Unemployment Gap 0.0091** 0.0046 0.0010 0.0011 0.0093* 0.0332* -0.0080 0.0081*
(0.0030) (0.0053) (0.0035) (0.0082) (0.0038) (0.0157) (0.0376) (0.0032)
Self-Employment Gap 0.0061** 0.0039 0.0121** -0.0028 0.0020 -0.0085 0.0318 0.0050
(0.0023) (0.0056) (0.0037) (0.0080) (0.0046) (0.0132) (0.0230) (0.0028)
Percent Subprime Credit -0.0008 0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0011 -0.0016 0.0142* 0.0049 -0.0009
(0.0009) (0.0019) (0.0012) (0.0028) (0.0014) (0.0068) (0.0087) (0.0011)
Percent Subprime Credit*Black -0.0033 -0.0006 -0.0016 0.0080 -0.0104 -0.0177 0.0213 -0.0039
(0.0046) (0.0088) (0.0057) (0.0162) (0.0075) (0.0310) (0.0330) (0.0052)
Wealth Gap -4.51e-05 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0007 0.0013 0.0006 -0.0001
(0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0015) (0.0005) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0004)
Delinquency Gap -0.0001 -0.0016 0.0039 -0.0006 -0.0034 -0.0045 -0.0087 -0.0003
(0.0022) (0.0035) (0.0026) (0.0057) (0.0029) (0.0119) (0.0248) (0.0023)
Owned Free/Clear Gap 0.0012 0.0029* 0.0011 0.0041 0.0021* 0.0016 -0.0031 0.0010
(0.0006) (0.0013) (0.0007) (0.0024) (0.0009) (0.0041) (0.0074) (0.0007)
Housing Costs Exceed 35% Gap 0.0003 0.0027 0.0007 0.00407* 0.0008 0.0002 -0.0055 0.0004
(0.0007) (0.0018) (0.0008) (0.0020) (0.0010) (0.0036) (0.0083) (0.0007)
Home Affordability Index 0.0004*** 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0003** 0.0010* -0.0007 0.0004***
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0011) (0.0001)________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
R-Squared 0.40 0.15 0.29 0.11 0.26 0.16 0.04 0.36
Counties 189 189 187 187 189 189 187 189_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
a
 Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
c
 Each regression shown also includes indicator variables representing whether the county is a central metropolitan county, outlying 
metropolitan county, or micropolitan county, with rural county being the omitted category.
b
 The table reports the coefficients from a regression of the black-white loan denial gap in each county on an index of the average 
prejudice of whites in those counties.  The dependent variable is the coefficient on the black indicator variable from separate linear 
probability models that control for the income and gender of the applicant, the gender of the co-applicant if applicable, the amount 
of the loan, the purpose  of the loan, the type of the property, information on occupancy and lien status, and census tract, lender, 
and year fixed effects; additionally, each linear probability model controls for the ratio of the loan amount to the median housing 
value of homes owned by members of the individual's racial group in the county of interest. The weights for each county are 
explained in the text.     
Table 2  Conditional Correlations between Denial Gaps and Racial Prejudice, Seperately by Loan Type
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________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Includes Lender 
Fixed Effects
Excludes Lender 
Fixed Effects
(1) (2)________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Avg. White Prejudice -0.0059 -0.0040
(0.0049) (0.0059)
Fraction Black 0.0422 -0.0535
(0.2180) (0.2750)
Log Population Density 0.0009 0.0042
(0.0049) (0.0061)
Bachelor's Degree Gap -0.0015* -0.0014
(0.0007) (0.0009)
Unemployment Gap -0.0004 0.0018
(0.0028) (0.0033)
Self-Employment Gap 0.0011 0.0015
(0.0017) (0.0020)
Percent Subprime Credit -0.0013 -0.0021
(0.0010) (0.0012)
Percent Subprime Credit*Black -0.0002 0.0018
(0.0053) (0.0068)
Wealth Gap 0.0003 0.0005
(0.0003) (0.0004)
Delinquency Gap 0.0028 0.0026
(0.0032) (0.0040)
Owned Free/Clear Gap -0.0006 -0.0006
(0.0007) (0.0009)
Housing Costs Exceed 35% Gap -0.0004 -0.0006
(0.0006) (0.0007)
Home Affordability Index 0.0004*** 0.0005***
(0.0001) (0.0001)________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
R-Squared 0.289 0.302
Counties 189 189________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Table 3  Conditional Correlations between Selection Into FHA Loans and 
Racial Prejudice
b
 The table reports the coefficients from a regression of the black-white 
gap in FHA to conventional loans in each county on an index of the average 
prejudice of whites in those counties. The dependent variable is the 
coefficient on the black indicator variable from separate linear probability 
models that control for the income and gender of the applicant, the gender 
of the co-applicant if applicable, the amount of the loan, the purpose of the 
loan, the type of the property, information on occupancy and lien status, 
and census tract, lender (in column 1), and year fixed effects; additionally, 
each linear probability model controls for the ratio of the loan amount to 
the median housing value of homes owned by members of the individual's 
racial group in the county of interest. The weights for each county are 
explained in the text.     
a
 Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, 
* p<0.05
c
 Each regression shown also includes indicator variables representing 
whether the county is a central metropolitan county, outlying metropolitan 
county, or micropolitan county, with rural county being the omitted 
category.
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________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Income-to- Log Income Income-to- Log Income Bachelor's
Loan Conv. Conv. Loan FHA FHA Degree Unemployment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Avg. White Prejudice 0.0438 -0.0163 -0.00231 -0.00357 2.777* -0.202
(0.0535) (0.0135) -0.0073 -0.0093 (1.270) (0.196)
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
R-Squared 0.004 0.008 0.001 0.001 0.060 0.014
Counties 189 189 189 189 189 189________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Self- Owned Excess
Employment Wealth Delinquency Free/Clear Housing Costs
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11)_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Avg. White Prejudice 0.315 -1.345 0.326 -1.594 0.399
(0.187) (0.998) (0.336) (1.127) (0.506)
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
R-Squared 0.024 0.017 0.011 0.028 0.004
Counties 189 189 189 189 189________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Table 4  Bivariate Regression of Racial Gaps in Observable Characteristics on Average White Prejudice
b
 The table reports the coefficients from a regression of the black-white gap in each characteristic on an index 
of the average prejudice of whites in those counties.   The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 are the 
black-white income-to-loan ratio gap and the log income gap, respectively, for conventional loan applicants.  
The dependent variable in columns 3 and 4 are the black-white income-to-loan ratio gap and the log income 
gap, respectively, for FHA-issured loan applicants. The regressions in columns 1-4 are estimated by FGLS, and 
the weights for each state are explained in the text. The dependent variables in columns 5-11 represent state-
level gaps calculated from ACS, SIPP, and HUD data.  The regressions in columns 5-8 are weighted by the 
state black and white population and regressions in columns 9-11 are weighted by the number of housing 
units occupied by blacks or whites.
a
 Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.5
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Supplemental Appendix  
Data Sources 
The article discusses that the years of data were selected to maximize the accuracy of the 
covariates and minimize the extent of reverse causality. Hence, the dataset includes independent 
variables closest to and preferably prior to 2009 and dependent variables from 2009 onward. 
Again, the prejudice index includes the years 1993-2008 because representativeness improves 
when additional years of the GSS are pooled due to the inclusion of additional sampling frames 
and additional individual observations each year. In a set of robustness checks, a more current 
measure of racial prejudice was estimated that limited the sample to the years 2000-2008 and 
included the sub-sample of the 189 counties with at least 20 observations in this period. This 
reanalysis finds substantively similar albeit more imprecise estimates: statistical significance at 
the 10% level in the conditional market as a whole and in the conditional first-lien home 
purchase market and statistical significance at the 5% level in the conditional refinancing market. 
Another set of robustness checks was estimated that separated the time period of observation of 
the dependent variables into the periods 2009-2011 and 2012-2015. This reanalysis finds 
substantively similar estimates in each period, though standard errors are larger when the time 
periods are separated due to increased imprecision in the gaps. 
As mentioned, the dataset also includes covariates closest to and preferably prior to 2009. 
American Community Survey 5-year estimates are included from 2006-2010 because 5-year 
estimates minimize the number of censored data points and some relevant 5-year estimates lack 
availability prior to 2010. Similarly, the 2010 location-based delinquency gap is used because 
2010 is the first year delinquency data is included in the Neighborhood Stabilization Program. 
Likewise, the 2010 home affordability index is used since ESRI releases the index only once 
every five years. In addition, estimating the wealth gap by aggregating separate survey periods in 
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the SIPP improves representativeness of the estimates. In addition to the data sources discussed 
in the main text, within the robustness checks subsection this study also makes use of the black-
white dissimilarity index calculated over census tracts within county using the 2006-2010 ACS 
5-year Estimates and the variance of the home price index over the period of 2004-2008 from the 
Federal Housing Finance Agency.i 
 [Insert Table A1 here]  
 
Prejudice Index Methodology 
To create a racial prejudice index for each white individual in the GSS, this study uses the 
method introduced by Charles and Guryan (2008) and utilized by Kopkin (2017). Table A2 
shows the years that each question was asked for questions included in the index.ii First, this 
study codes higher values to correspond to more prejudiced answers and then normalizes the 
response to each question by the mean and standard deviation in 1993.iii The study normalizes 
each response by the 1993 value of the standard deviation so that the relative weight of each 
question does not change over time. Formally, let	 	be respondent i’s response to question q in 
year t. Then respondent i’s normalized response to question q in year t,	 , is given by: 
       =	 	

	[	, ]
(	, )
.                                                      (A1) 
                                                 
i The county-level home price index is a developmental index discussed in Bogin et al. (2016). For the purposes of 
calculating the variance, the analysis rebases all counties so that 2004 takes the value 100 in the index.  
ii Where available, this study uses the same questions that Charles and Guryan (2008) use with a few notable 
exceptions. For one, Charles and Guryan (2008) use GSS waves from 1972-2004 while this study uses GSS waves 
from 1993-2008 to more accurately assess current prejudice; their study also uses some questions no longer asked 
post-1991. Moreover, Charles and Guryan (2008) include the question “Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other 
minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Do you believe blacks should do the same without special 
favors?” This study excludes the question as it also focuses on views pertaining to the appropriate role of 
government and affirmative action. In addition, this study uses two questions that ask “On the average blacks have 
worse jobs, income, and housing than white people. Do you think these differences are because most blacks have 
less in-born ability to learn?” and “On the average blacks have worse jobs, income, and housing than white people. 
Do you think these differences are because most blacks just don't have the motivation or will power to pull 
themselves up out of poverty?” that were not used by Charles and Guryan (2008). 
iii Three of the questions were not asked in 1993. Answers to these questions are normalized by the mean and 
standard deviation from the first year the question was asked. 
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Figure A1 shows how normalized responses to each question have changed over time from 
1993-2008. While prejudice has generally fallen over time there is variation in the decline across 
questions. For instance, the fraction of respondents stating they would vote for a qualified black 
candidate for president in 2008 is much larger than in 1993 but the fraction of respondents 
stating they believe that blacks have less motivation, willpower, and in-born ability to learn has 
declined at a much slower rate. 
[Insert Table A2 here] 
[Insert Fig. A1 here] 
After normalizing the response to each question for each individual, the study then calculates 
the average of each individual’s normalized responses. Formally, let  = ∑ ⁄ , where  is 
the total number of prejudice questions in year t. To separate the county-specific component of 
racial prejudice from the time-specific component, the study then estimates a regression of   on 
individual year fixed effects to find the residual	  , referred to in this study as the individual-
level prejudice index. 
Using the individual-level prejudice index and standardized responses to each question, the 
study then estimates a regression of each outcome on age, years of education, and an indicator 
variable for male, as well as state and year fixed effects, to determine how prejudice varies 
across the population. Regressions describing the individual-level prejudice index and the 
standardized responses to each question are shown in Table A3. It is a commonly held belief that 
older people, the less educated, and men tend to be more prejudiced. On average, the individual-
level prejudice index increases with age, decreases with education, and is larger for males. The 
study cannot reject that the same is true of the standardized responses to each question. 
Furthermore, answers to all of the normalized prejudice questions are positively correlated – 
most highly correlated – with other questions and with the individual-level index. These results 
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are consistent with Charles and Guryan (2008) and provide confidence that the individual-level 
prejudice index is an accurate measure of prejudicial attitudes.  
[Insert Table A3 here] 
Once the individual-level prejudice index,  , is obtained for each individual, the study 
calculates the average   in each county to create the county-level index.iv,v Although this study 
uses a county-level index of racial prejudice, contractual arrangements with NORC prohibit the 
study from displaying any summary statistics from the GSS Sensitive Data Files at a more 
narrow geography than the census division. Thus, Figure A2 shows the distribution of prejudice 
across census divisions.  The East South Central division (AL, KY, MI, TN) is the most 
prejudiced, followed by the West South Central (AR, LA, OK, TX) and South Atlantic divisions 
(DE, DC, FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA, WV). The New England (CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT), 
Mountain (AZ, CO, ID, NM, MT, UT, NV, WY), and Pacific divisions (AK, CA, HI, OR, WA) 
are the least prejudiced. These tabulations follow closely with generally held beliefs. 
Additionally, Figure A3 shows how prejudice has changed over time in each census division. In 
the majority of census divisions there is not much movement in the prejudice index over time. It 
is important to note that fluctuations in the prejudice index over time might occur not only 
because prejudice is changing but also because the mix of questions asked and the individuals 
sampled in each year are changing. Stability of the prejudice index within each census division 
                                                 
iv To perform this calculation observations are weighted by the number of adults in the household and the weights 
are corrected for survey non-response where possible (2004-2008). This is done because the full-probability GSS 
samples are designed to give each household an equal probability of inclusion in the sample, and each adult in the 
household then has an equal probability of inclusion in the survey. Left unweighted, this would serve to under-
represent individuals from large households and over-represent individuals from small ones. As a robustness check, 
an alternative specification is estimated in which the state-level prejudice index is calculated using unweighted GSS 
data. The use of weights has no substantive impact on the estimate of the conditional correlation between average 
white prejudice and the black-white conventional loan denial rate gap.  
v Additionally, individuals are reweighted so that each county-year combination takes equal weight in the county-
level index. This convention was chosen because the sample size from each county is changing over time and one 
would prefer not to overweight some years over others when calculating racial prejudice. Despite the fact that the 
data is time-detrended, it is possible that prejudice is falling at a different rate across counties. Without this 
adjustment the results are substantively similar.  
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over time further supports the use of the average county-level prejudice index over this time 
span.    
[Insert Fig. A2 here] 
[Insert Fig. A3 here] 
 
Standard Error Estimation 
Since the dependent variable in equation (2) is estimated, the error term,  , can be 
decomposed into two components: sampling error,	! , and standard regression error, " . It is then 
immediate that the error term is heteroskedastic since estimates from larger counties will 
generally have less sampling variance associated with them. Thus, weighted least squares with 
weights equal to the inverse of the standard deviation of the error term,	1/%(&' + ) '), where 
&'=Var(" ) and ) '=Var(! ), will produce the most efficient parameter estimates for equation (2). 
) ' is approximated using the estimate of the sampling variance of *+,-  from equation (1). 
However, given that &' is not observed, it must be estimated by feasible generalized least 
squares (FGLS). Using FGLS, &' is approximated by estimating equation (2) by unweighted 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Next, the residuals, . , are retrieved from the 
unweighted OLS regression. Then, given that equation (1) is estimated using a linear probability 
model, &' can be estimated by:  
 
&.' = ∑ /.010 ∑ 23 010 4567879
:;78<7=
>? ,                             (A2)              
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where .  is the residual for county j from the second-step unweighted OLS regression, )3 ' is the 
estimated sampling variance of *.+ , @ is the matrix of state-level independent variables, < is the 
diagonal matrix with ) ' as the diagonal elements, J is the number of counties, and k is the 
number of county-level independent variables including the constant. Equation (2) is then re-
estimated, weighted by	1/%(&.' + )3 ').vi 
As a separate and unrelated issue, the variable of interest in equation (2), ABCD , is estimated. 
In a regression framework failure to account for estimation of a covariate could result in 
substantially understated standard errors. The issue is especially important in this context 
because the estimated covariate comes from a dataset, the GSS, with relatively few observations 
per county. Thus, to correct for imprecision in the estimated regressor this study bootstraps 
standard errors stratified on GSS year and primary sampling unit; bootstrapping produces much 
more conservative standard errors.vii  
 
Select Robustness Checks 
This section discusses a number of select robustness checks of the conditional correlation 
between racial prejudice and the racial denial gap in the conventional market. In total, the 
takeaway from this section is that the estimate of the conditional correlation between racial 
prejudice and the racial denial gap in the conventional market is relatively robust to the inclusion 
or exclusion of controls for racial gaps in education, wealth, unemployment, delinquencies, etc., 
                                                 
vi Robustness checks were performed using unweighted OLS and weighted least squares with weights equal to the 
inverse of the estimated sampling variance associated with *.+E from equation (1). The choice of weights has no 
substantive impact on the estimates of interest or the standard errors associated with these estimates.  
vii Each bootstrapped standard error is calculated using 1000 replications.  
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as the bivariate correlation remains relatively unchanged after the inclusion of the full set of 
controls.  
Table A4 shows estimates of the correlation between racial prejudice and the racial denial 
gap in the conventional market adding additional covariates across columns to show how the 
addition of variables changes the estimate. A one standard deviation increase in average white 
prejudice is associated with an increase in the racial denial gap in the conventional market by 
between 0.91 and 1.43 percentage points in columns 1-6 and each estimate is statistically 
significant at the 5% level. Exclusion of lender fixed effects, as shown in column 6, increases the 
size of the estimate by approximately 34%, thereby revealing that the conditional correlation 
between racial prejudice and the racial denial gap in the conventional market is smaller within 
lender than across all loan applications in a county.  
[Insert Table A4 here] 
Table A5 shows a series of other select robustness checks of the estimated conditional 
correlation between racial prejudice and the racial denial gap in the conventional market. The 
specification in column 1 includes the variance of the house price index in each county between 
2004 and 2008 from the Federal Housing Finance Agency as a measure of home price volatility 
in the local market. Home price volatility may affect perceived lender risk and thus dictate how 
broadly lenders are willing to lend. When home price volatility is included, the estimated 
correlation between racial prejudice and the racial denial gap in the conventional market is 
attenuated but remains statistically significant at the 5% level.  
[Insert Table A5 here] 
The specification in column 2 includes the black-white dissimilarity index, a measure of 
racial segregation, as an explanatory variable. The study omits this variable from in its main 
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analysis because it is potentially endogenous. For example, if lenders in more racially prejudiced 
counties are more likely to deny loan applications from black applicants in largely-white census 
tracts this would result in more racially segregated counties. Thus, this variable may be an 
outcome of racial prejudice and is not a suitable input variable in the model. Nonetheless, when 
the dissimilarity index is included the conditional correlation between the racial prejudice and 
the racial denial gap in the conventional market is only slightly attenuated (as compared to the 
result shown in column 1 of Table 2) and remains statistically significant at the 5% level. 
The specifications in columns 3 and 4 include indicator variables representing whether an 
applicant is included in the Private Mortgage Insurance Companies (PMIC) database in the first-
step regression. If a conventional loan applicant cannot afford a down payment of 20% of the 
purchase price a lender will require the applicant apply for private mortgage insurance. The 
private mortgage insurance company will protect the lender in the case of borrower default in 
exchange for an annual premium of between 0.3%-1.15% of the purchase price. Therefore, 
individuals found in the PMIC database are those that had a down payment of less than 20% and 
have applied for private mortgage insurance. PMIC may be matched to HMDA using observable 
applicant characteristics. Those applicants matched to the PMIC database are generally less 
likely to be denied a loan regardless of the county in which they reside. The indicator variable in 
the specification in column 3 includes all possible matches as indicated by a fuzzy matching 
algorithm while the one in column 4 includes only exact matches.viii In both cases the inclusion 
                                                 
viii Of the 2.24 million in-sample observations found in PMIC, approximately 52% can be matched exactly on 
observable applicant and co-applicant characteristics and an additional 24% can be matched based on a fuzzy 
matching algorithm. For applicants without exact matches, it is first assumed that the applicant and co-applicant 
have been swapped. For remaining unmatched applicants, it is then assumed that PMIC applicants have the amount 
of the loan mismeasured by as much as $1,000. For remaining unmatched applicants, it is then assumed that 
unmatched applicants have income miusmeasured by as much as $5,000. For remaining unmatched applicants, it is 
then assumed that PMIC applicants have the amount of the loan mismeasured by as much as $5,000. For remaining 
unmatched applicants, it is then assumed that PMIC applicants have income and the amount of the loan both 
mismeasured by as much as $5,000. Remaining unmatched applicants are then matched on county instead of census 
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of the PMIC indicator variable in the first stage has no substantive impact on the estimate of 
interest.  
The specification in column 5 omits from all first-step regressions loan observations with 
missing census tracts. This results in 15,583 additional applications dropped from the 189 county 
sampling frame. Further, the specification in column 6 drops all but the first occurrence of all 
observations identical across all observed covariates aside for the lender to account for the filing 
of multiple applications by the same applicant. This results in an additional 37,407 applications 
dropped from the 189 county sampling frame. In both cases the estimates are substantively 
similar to the main result in column 1 of Table 2 and remain statistically significant at the 5% 
level.  
The specifications in columns 7 and 8 show that the results are robust to alternative methods 
of calculating the prejudice index. In the primary analysis each GSS observation is weighted by 
the number of adults in household and weights are corrected for survey non-response where 
possible (2004-2008). Observations are weighted in this way because the full-probability GSS 
samples are designed to give each household an equal probability of inclusion in the sample. 
Each adult in the household then has an equal probability of inclusion in the survey. Left 
unweighted, the index would under-represent respondents from large households and over-
represent respondents from small ones. In the specification in column 7 the conditional 
correlation between racial prejudice and the racial loan denial gap in the conventional market is 
estimated using unweighted GSS data. This adjustment has no substantive impact on the 
estimate. Additionally, in the primary analysis the prejudice index gives all county-year 
combinations equal weight in the county-level index. The study chooses this conventional 
                                                                                                                                                             
tract. Any remaining unmatched applicants are then matched on the characteristics of the applicant and ignore co-
applicant characteristics. 
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because the sample size from each county is changing over time and one would prefer not to 
overweight some years over others when calculating racial prejudice. Despite the fact that the 
data are time-detrended it is possible that prejudice is falling at a different rate across counties. 
Therefore, in the specification in column 8 the conditional correlation between racial prejudice 
and the racial denial gap in the conventional market is estimated without this adjustment to the 
prejudice index. Once again, this adjustment has no substantive impact on the estimate. 
While not shown for the sake of brevity, additional robustness checks of the second-step 
regression were estimated using unweighted OLS regression and weighted least squares 
regression with weights equal to the inverse of the standard error of the estimated racial denial 
gap in the conventional market. Under unweighted OLS regression the resulting conditional 
correlation is substantively similar to the main result found in column 1 of Table 2. Under 
weighted least squares regression with inverse standard error weights the resulting conditional 
correlation is more pronounced and is statistically significant at the 0.1% level.ix 
 
Average Black-White Denial Gaps by Loan Type and Prejudice Quartile 
Table A6 shows the fraction of the conditional racial denial gap that can be attributed to 
racial prejudice between the 1st and 2nd quartile, 1st and 3rd quartile, and 1st and 4th quartile of the 
prejudice distribution separately by market type based on coefficients in Table 2. This 
information can help one better understand the results presented in Table 2 of the main text. For 
example, the article discusses the fact that racial prejudice can account for approximately 61% of 
the average black-white denial gap difference in conventional loans between counties in the least 
and most prejudiced quartiles; this estimate is shown in column 1 of Table A6. Table A6 further 
shows that racial prejudice can account for approximately 40% of the difference between the 2nd 
                                                 
ix These results are available from the author upon request. 
Page 39 of 57
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cus  Ruth.Harkin@glasgow.ac.uk
Urban Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
11 
 
and 4th quartiles and 39% of the difference between the 3rd and 4th quartiles of the prejudice 
distribution in the market for conventional loans.  
Table A6 further shows estimates for the other loan types discussed in the article. Most 
notably substantively similar and precisely estimated impacts are found in the conventional first-
lien home purchase market and conventional non-HUD market. Substantively smaller estimated 
impacts are found in the FHA-insured market, FHA first-lien home purchase market, FHA 
refinancing market, and conventional HUD market.   
[Insert Table A6 here] 
 
Reconciling Average Prejudice and Lender Prejudice  
The primary analysis uses the distribution of prejudice among all whites that reside within a 
county to estimate conditional correlations between racial prejudice and racial denial gaps. 
However, lenders are the only agents whose tastes for discrimination influence the lending 
decision. Since the primary analysis includes the prejudice of non-lenders when calculating 
average prejudice in each county, the primary analysis implicitly assumes that the average 
prejudice of whites in each county is the same as the average prejudice of white lenders in that 
county. Based on Table A3 this assumption is unlikely to be correct. 
In the GSS the 171 individuals identified as working in managerial occupations in banking, 
savings, and loan organizations have 1.7 years of additional education, are 13.2 percentage 
points more likely to be female, and are nearly a full year younger.x Since Table A3 shows that 
older people are more prejudiced, more educated people less prejudiced, and men significantly 
more prejudiced than women, lenders should on average be less prejudiced toward blacks than 
                                                 
x Differences in education and the likelihood of being female are statistically significant at the 5% level. The 
difference in age is not statistically significant. 
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the rest of the population. The data shows that bank managers are indeed less prejudiced than 
non-lenders and the difference is statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Since only 171 individuals in the GSS can be identified in managerial positions in the 
banking, savings, and loan industry, estimating the average prejudice of ‘lenders’ in each county 
with such a small sample would be futile. The goal then is to extrapolate observable information 
about these ‘lenders’ to the rest of the white population. To more closely match the distribution 
of racial prejudice among white ‘lenders’ with the distribution of prejudice across the entire 
white population this study uses propensity score reweighting. To determine which individuals 
most closely resemble ‘lenders’ the analysis uses age, years of education, gender, and all 4th 
degree polynomials and interaction terms. The analysis then up-weights individuals that closely 
resemble managers in the banking, savings, and loan industry based on age, education, and 
gender and down-weights individuals that do not.       
Figure A4 shows the distribution of prejudice among whites in managerial positions in the 
banking, savings, and loan industry, among the entire white population, and among the entire 
white population reweighted by the propensity score. While the distribution of prejudice among 
the entire population is clearly to the right of the distribution of ‘lender’ prejudice, reweighting 
by the propensity score brings the distribution of prejudice among the populace much closer to 
that of ‘lenders.’ Next, the study re-estimates the conditional correlations between racial 
prejudice and racial denial gaps in the mortgage market using the average prejudice among the 
reweighted population in each county.   
Table A7 shows the conditional correlations between racial prejudice and racial denial gaps 
in each market using the reweighted prejudice index. The estimates from Table A7 are 
substantively similar to those presented in Table 2 with a couple of notable exceptions. While the 
Page 41 of 57
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cus  Ruth.Harkin@glasgow.ac.uk
Urban Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
13 
 
conditional correlation between racial prejudice and the racial denial gap in the conventional 
market is substantively similar, the conditional correlation in the FHA market is much larger 
than in Table 2 though still statistically insignificant; the same can be said of the conditional 
correlation between racial prejudice and the racial denial gaps in the conventional and FHA first-
lien home purchase markets. Among refinancing loans, the estimate of the conditional 
correlation is somewhat smaller in the conventional market than in Table 2 and the estimate of 
the conditional correlation is much, much larger in the FHA-insured market than in Table 2, 
though both remain statistically insignificant. The conditional correlation between racial 
prejudice and the racial denial gap among non-depository institutions in the conventional market 
remains statistically insignificant though it is now much larger in magnitude.  
[Insert Table A7 here] 
 
Evidence of Racial Prejudice in the Prevalence of High-Priced Loans 
Lastly, this study analyzes the conditional correlations between racial prejudice and the 
prevalence of high-priced loans in each of the specified mortgage markets. HMDA does not 
provide the interest rate on all loans. Instead, the most relevant variable related to the interest rate 
is the rate spread. The rate spread is the spread between the Annual Percentage Rate (APR) of a 
loan and the average APR offered on a comparable prime mortgage loan. However, reporting of 
the rate spread in HMDA is less than ideal since the rate spread is reported only for loans that are 
originated, secured by a lien, and have a rate spread exceeding a pre-defined threshold (1.5 
percentage points for loans secured by a first lien and 3.5 percentage points for loans secured by 
a subordinate lien). Nonetheless, it is worth exploring whether the prevalence of high-price loans 
is conditionally correlated with racial prejudice. To do so, the study uses the methodology 
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discussed in the article using the sample of originated loans replacing the dependent variable in 
Eq. 1 by an indicator variable equal to 1 if an originated loan is above the rate spread threshold 
and equal to 0 otherwise. 
Table A8 shows estimates from county-level regressions of the conditional racial gap in the 
prevalence of high-priced loans in each of the specified markets on the index of racial prejudice. 
The estimate in column 1 shows that a one standard deviation increase in average white 
prejudice is associated with a 0.40 percentage point increase in the racial gap in the prevalence of 
high-priced loans in the conventional market that is statistically significant at the 5% level. The 
estimate in column 2 in the FHA market is of a similar magnitude but is statistically 
insignificant. Estimates in columns 3 and 4 show the conditional correlations between racial 
prejudice and racial gaps in the prevalence of high-priced loans in the conventional first-lien 
home purchase market and FHA first-lien home purchase market; in comparison to the 
conditional correlation between racial prejudice and racial gaps in the prevalence of high-priced 
loans in the conventional market shown in column 1 both estimates are substantively large but 
statistically insignificant.  
Estimates in columns 5 and 6 show the comparable conditional correlations in the 
conventional refinancing market and FHA refinancing market; the estimate in the conventional 
refinancing market shows that a one standard deviation increase in average white prejudice 
increases the racial gap in the prevalence of high-priced loans in the conventional refinancing 
market by 0.61 percentage points and is statistically significant at the 5% level while the estimate 
in the FHA refinancing market is relatively small and statistically insignificant. Lastly, estimates 
in columns 7 and 8 further examine the conditional correlations between racial prejudice and 
racial gaps in the prevalence of high-priced loans in the conventional market by depository 
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institutions and non-depository institutions covered by HUD. Both estimates are substantively 
similar to the estimate in the conventional market as a whole but neither is statistically 
significant.xi 
Estimates of the conditional correlations between racial prejudice and racial gaps in the 
prevalence of high-priced loans shown in Table A8 may be understated for a number of reasons. 
First, these estimates only account for loans that exceed the rate spread threshold. Therefore, 
smaller differences in interest rates charged to comparable black and white borrowers, which 
would theoretically occur more often in more racially prejudiced counties, go uncaptured.  
Second, because the rate spread is only reported for originated loans the sample does not capture 
approved loan applications that are not accepted by the applicant. Sensibly, an applicant would 
be more likely to refuse the terms of a loan charging an exceptionally high interest rate. If there 
are more high-priced loans charged to blacks in more racially prejudiced counties that go 
unaccepted by the applicant this would understate the estimates. Third, the article shows 
evidence that blacks are more likely to be denied loans in racially prejudiced counties. Therefore, 
it is worth questioning whether discriminatory lenders deny loans as an alternative to charging 
blacks higher interest rates, as discrimination in loan pricing is easier for government agencies to 
verify than discrimination in denials. Nevertheless, despite the possibility of downward bias in 
the estimates, Table A8 shows that racial disparities in the prevalence of high-priced loans in the 
conventional market are largest in counties where racial prejudice is greatest conditional on 
observable individual- and county-level characteristics. However, Table A8 shows no statistical 
evidence that the same is true in the FHA-insured market. 
                                                 
xi
 Research shows that non-depository institutions are much more likely to target blacks with high-interest loans 
(Ghent et al., 2014). However, this analysis shows no statistical evidence that blacks are more likely to be charged 
higher interest rates than whites by non-depository institutions as compared to depository institutions in more 
prejudiced counties. 
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_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Variable Source Years___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Black-White Loan Denial Gaps Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 2009-2015
Avg. White Prejudice General Social Survey 1993-2008
Fraction Black American Community Survey 2006-2010 5-year Estimates
Population Density American Community Survey 2006-2010 5-year Estimates
Bachelor's Degree Gap American Community Survey 2006-2010 5-year Estimates
Unemployment Gap American Community Survey 2006-2010 5-year Estimates
Self-Employment Gap American Community Survey 2006-2010 5-year Estimates
Percent Population Subprime Credit Federal Reserve Economic Data 2008 Q1 - 2008 Q4
Wealth Gap Survey of Income & Program Participation 2004 Wave 6 & 2008 Wave 4
Location-Based Delinquency Gap Neighborhood Stabilization Program 2010
Owned Free/Clear Gap American Community Survey 2006-2010 5-year Estimates
Housing Costs Exceed 35% Gap American Community Survey 2006-2010 5-year Estimates
Home Affordability Index Environmental Systems Research Institute 2010
Dissimilarity Index American Communiy Survey 2006-2010 5-year Estimates
Home Price Volatility Federal Housing Finance Agency 2004-2008____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Table A1 Data Sources
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Table A3  Determination of Prejudice at the Individual Level
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables PREJ INDEX RACDIF2 RACDIF4 CLOSEBLK RACMAR RACOPEN_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Age 0.00767*** 0.00901*** 0.00601*** 0.00541*** 0.00993*** 0.00839***
(0.000327) (0.000663) (0.000544) (0.000924) (0.000795) (0.000897)
Education -0.0513*** -0.0581*** -0.0711*** -0.0240*** -0.0658*** -0.0205***
(0.00255) (0.00477) (0.00370) (0.00588) (0.00619) (0.00515)
Male 0.105*** 0.0492** 0.0742*** 0.0768*** -0.00132 0.174***
(0.0120) (0.0183) (0.0217) (0.0229) (0.0212) (0.0309)
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Observations 17,477 10,540 10,184 7,591 7,497 6,467
R-squared 0.122 0.074 0.088 0.046 0.158 0.067_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Variables RACPUSH RACPRES RACSEG RACSCHL FEELBLKS RACCHNG_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Age 0.0134*** 0.00253** 0.0135*** 0.00527*** 0.00607*** 0.00856***
(0.000856) (0.000946) (0.00210) (0.000908) (6.05e-11) (0.00160)
Education -0.0877*** -0.0484*** -0.0706*** -0.0223*** -0.0442*** -0.0423***
(0.00929) (0.00536) (0.0111) (0.00605) (3.98e-10) (0.00829)
Male 0.182*** 0.0937*** 0.0657** 0.0276 0.262*** 0.109
(0.0242) (0.0246) (0.0288) (0.0437) (1.51e-09) (0.0736)
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Observations 6061 4,177 3221 3,117 2151 1,212
R-squared 0.188 0.066 0.163 0.054 0.079 0.134_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Robust standard errors clustered on state and year in parenthesis.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
aAll GSS prejudice questions are standardized by the mean and standard deviation of the first year that each question is asked.  Each 
regression controls for state and year fixed effects.
bCLOSEBLK- In general, how close do you feel to blacks?, FEELBLKS- In general, how warm or cool do you feel towards blacks?,
RACCHNG- If you and your friends belonged to a social club that would not let blacks join, would you try to change the rules so that 
blacks could join?, RACDIF2- On the average blacks have worse jobs, income, and housing than white people.  Do you think these
differences are because most blacks have less in-born abil ity to learn?, RACDIF4- On the average blacks have worse jobs, income, and
housing than white people.  Do you think these differences are because most blacks just don't have the motivation or will  power to pull
themselves up out of poverty?, RACMAR-Do you think there should be laws against marriages between blacks and whites?, 
RACOPEN-Do you agree that a homeowner should be able to decide for himself whom to sell  his house to, even if he prefers not to sell
 to blacks?, RACPRES- If your party nominated a black for President, would you vote for him if he were qualified for the job?
RACPUSH- Do you agree that blacks shouldn’t push themselves where they’re not wanted?, RACSCHL- Would you yourself have any 
objection to sending your children to a school where a few/half/most of the children are black?, RACSEG- Do you agree that white 
people have a right to keep blacks out of their neighborhoods if they want to, and blacks should respect that right?
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________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Avg. White Prejudice 0.0112* 0.0091* 0.0130** 0.0132** 0.0096* 0.0143*
(0.0044) (0.0045) (0.0043) (0.0045) (0.0042) (0.0056)
Fraction Black 0.128*** 0.0945** 0.3440 0.2590 0.3810
(0.0284) (0.0293) (0.2160) (0.2230) (0.2470)
Log Population Density 0.0032 -0.0003 -0.0012 0.0022 -0.0010
(0.0036) (0.0038) (0.0051) (0.0045) (0.0052)
Bachelor's Degree Gap -0.0011 -0.0010 -0.0006 -0.0012
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007)
Unemployment Gap 0.0082** 0.0080* 0.0087** 0.0101**
(0.0028) (0.0033) (0.0031) (0.0036)
Self-Employment Gap 0.0080** 0.0076** 0.0064* 0.0056*
(0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0026) (0.0027)
Percent Subprime Credit 0.0008 -0.0005 -0.0006
(0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0012)
Percent Subprime Credit*Black -0.0064 -0.0047 -0.0065
(0.0053) (0.0054) (0.0059)
Wealth Gap -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Delinquency Gap 0.0005 -0.0009
(0.0022) (0.0026)
Owned Free/Clear Gap 0.0013 0.0017*
(0.0007) (0.0008)
Housing Costs Exceed 35% Gap 0.0002 -4.51e-05
(0.0007) (0.0009)
Home Affordability Index 0.0003*** 0.0004***
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Lender Fixed Effects in First Step Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
County Type Fixed Effects in Second Step No No No No No Yes________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
R-Squared 0.035 0.120 0.274 0.285 0.368 0.393
Counties 189 189 189 189 189 189________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
a
 Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
   Table A4  Conditional Correlations between Conventional Loan Denial Gaps and Racial Prejudice
b
 The table reports the coefficients from a regression of the black-white loan denial gap in each county on an 
index of the average prejudice of whites in those counties.  The dependent variable is the coefficient on the 
black indicator variable from separate linear probability models that control for the income and gender of the 
applicant, the gender of the co-applicant if applicable, the amount of the loan, the purpose  of the loan, the type 
of the property, information on occupancy and lien status, and census tract, lender (in columns 1-5), and year 
fixed effects; additionally, each linear probability model controls for the ratio of the loan amount to the median 
housing value of homes owned by members of the individual's racial group in the county of interest. The 
weights for each county are explained in the text.     
c
 The regression shown in column 6 also includes indicator variables for county type, representing whether the 
county is a central metropolitan county, outlying metropolitan county, or micropolitan county, with rural county 
being the omitted category.
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________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Include Include PMIC PMIC 
Home Price Dissimilarity All Exact
Volatility Index Matches Matches
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Avg. White Prejudice 0.00882* 0.0094* 0.0111* 0.0112* 0.00972* 0.00998* 0.0118** 0.0113**
(0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0044) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043)
Fraction Black 0.1940 0.2530 0.3510 0.3520 0.1910 0.1910 0.2310 0.2110
(0.180) (0.1840) (0.2030) (0.2030) (0.190) (0.1890) (0.1960) (0.1950)
Log Population Density 0.0013 -0.0012 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016 0.0008 0.0008
(0.0044) (0.0042) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0044)
Bachelor's Degree Gap -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0007
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Unemployment Gap 0.0086** 0.0098*** 0.0087** 0.0087** 0.0096** 0.0096** 0.0089** 0.0096**
(0.0031) (0.0029) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030)
Self-Employment Gap 0.0065** 0.0060* 0.0046 0.0047 0.0063** 0.0063** 0.0061** 0.0062**
(0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0024)
Percent Subprime Credit -0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0009 -0.0009
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0010)
Percent Subprime Credit*Black -0.0028 -0.0036 -0.0059 -0.0060 -0.0026 -0.0026 -0.0033 -0.0029
(0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0045) (0.0044) (0.0046) (0.0045)
Wealth Gap -0.0001 3.96e-05 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Delinquency Gap 0.0003 -0.0035 -0.0023 -0.0024 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0002
(0.0022) (0.0032) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022)
Owned Free/Clear Gap 0.0012 0.0012 0.0010 0.0010 0.0013* 0.0013* 0.0012 0.0012
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Housing Costs Exceed 35% Gap 0.0004 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0004 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Home Affordability Index 0.0003** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0004*** 0.0004***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Home Price Index Volatility -0.0001
(3.66e-05)
Black-White Dissimilarity Index 0.0010
(0.0006)________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
R-Squared 0.418 0.421 0.305 0.305 0.407 0.411 0.407 0.405
Counties 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
a
 Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
b
 The table reports the coefficients from a regression of the black-white loan denial gap in each county on an index of the average 
prejudice of whites in those counties.  The dependent variable is the coefficient on the black indicator variable from separate linear 
probability models that control for the income and gender of the applicant, the gender of the co-applicant if applicable, the amount of 
the loan, the purpose  of the loan, the type of the property, information on occupancy and lien status, and census tract, lender, and year 
fixed effects; additionally, each linear probability model controls for the ratio of the loan amount to the median housing value of homes 
owned by members of the individual's racial group in the county of interest. The weights for each county are explained in the text.     
c
 Each regression shown also includes indicator variables representing whether the county is a central metropolitan county, outlying 
metropolitan county, or micropolitan county, with rural county being the omitted category.
e
 Column 1 includes the variance of the county-level House Price Index from 2004-2008.  The specification in column 2 includes the 
black-white dissimilarily index. Specifications in columns 3 and 4 include an indicator variable in the first-step regression describing 
whether an individual from HMDA is included in PMIC.  The indicator variable in column 3 indicates all possible matches, while the 
indicator variable in column 4 includes only exact matches.  The specification in column 5 deletes from the first-step regressions all 
observations with missing census tract data while the specification in column 6 deletes from the first-step regressions all observations 
with identical data on a number of covariates. The speicifcation in column 7 uses a racial prejudice index calculated using unweighted 
GSS data, while the specification in column 8 does not weight all years evenly in the racial prejudice index. More details are discussed 
in the text.
Omit 
HMDA 
Missing 
Omit 
Duplicate 
Observation
GSS Years 
Not 
Reweighted
Use 
Unweighted 
GSS Data
Table A5  Selected Robustness Checks of Conventional Loan Specifications
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____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Conv. FHA
All All First Lien First Lien Conv. FHA Conv. Conv.
Conv. FHA Purchase Purchase Refinance Refinance HUD Non-HUD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________-
1st Quartile-4th Quartile 0.614** 0.183 0.654** 0.439 0.644 -0.002 0.012 0.635**
(0.195) (0.223) (0.241) (0.305) (0.361) (0.002) (0.015) (0.227)
2nd Quartile-4th Quartile 0.400** 0.046 0.388** 0.296 0.352 -0.001 0.007 0.441*
(0.147) (0.025) (0.141) (0.207) (0.195) (0.001) (0.009) (0.183)
3rd Quartile-4th Quartile 0.389* -4.609 0.249* 0.284 1.718 -0.001 0.005 0.399
(0.196) (345.8) (0.010) (0.338) (6.640) (0.001) (0.006) (0.220)___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Table A6 Fraction of Difference in Black-White Denial Gaps Due to Racial Prejudice
a
 Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
b
 Each fraction shown in the table is the fraction of the difference between conditional black-white denial gaps in 
specified prejudice quartiles estimated to be due to differences in racial prejudice between quartiles. Standard errors 
are estimated under the assumption that the estimated coefficients on 'Avg. White Prejudice' taken from Table 2 are 
the true population parameters.
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____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Conv. FHA
All All First Lien First Lien Conv. FHA Conv. Conv.
Conv. FHA Purchase Purchase Refinance Refinance HUD Non-HUD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________-
Avg. White Prejudice 0.0103* 0.0105 0.0117* 0.0340 0.0075 0.0263 0.0155 0.0097*
(0.0042) (0.0076) (0.0052) (0.0186) (0.0058) (0.0205) (0.0417) (0.0046)
Fraction Black 0.2250 0.0754 0.1420 -0.1640 0.5490 0.3560 -0.5780 0.2520
(0.20) (0.3510) (0.2330) (0.6710) (0.3150) (1.280) (1.6490) (0.2240)
Log Population Density 0.0007 0.0079 0.0002 0.0212 -0.0033 0.0322 -0.0115 0.0004
(0.0044) (0.0077) (0.0051) (0.0109) (0.0058) (0.0290) (0.0365) (0.0048)
Bachelor's Degree Gap -0.0006 0.0005 0.0001 0.0008 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0060 -0.0009
(0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0016) (0.0010) (0.0030) (0.0087) (0.0007)
Unemployment Gap 0.0095** 0.0051 0.0019 0.0026 0.0096* 0.0341* -0.0073 0.0086**
(0.0030) (0.0053) (0.0036) (0.0082) (0.0038) (0.0157) (0.0373) (0.0032)
Self-Employment Gap 0.0064** 0.0039 0.0124*** -0.0021 0.0021 -0.0083 0.0322 0.0052
(0.0023) (0.0056) (0.0037) (0.0075) (0.0047) (0.0134) (0.0238) (0.0028)
Percent Subprime Credit -0.0008 0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0010 -0.0015 0.0141* 0.0050 -0.0009
(0.0010) (0.0019) (0.0012) (0.0028) (0.0014) (0.0068) (0.0089) (0.0011)
Percent Subprime Credit*Black -0.0032 -0.0024 -0.0011 0.0043 -0.0101 -0.0235 0.0175 -0.0037
(0.0046) (0.0088) (0.0056) (0.0169) (0.0076) (0.0304) (0.0346) (0.0052)
Wealth Gap 7.06e-06 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0006 0.0015 0.0006 -0.0001
(0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0015) (0.0005) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0004)
Delinquency Gap -1.47e-05 -0.0026 0.0041 -0.0030 -0.0032 -0.0077 -0.0108 -0.0002
(0.0022) (0.0036) (0.0027) (0.0061) (0.0029) (0.0118) (0.0269) (0.0023)
Owned Free/Clear Gap 0.0013* 0.0030* 0.0012 0.0043 0.0022* 0.0016 -0.0031 0.0011
(0.0006) (0.0013) (0.0007) (0.0024) (0.0009) (0.0041) (0.0075) (0.0007)
Housing Costs Exceed 35% Gap 0.0003 0.0027 0.0007 0.00389* 0.0009 4.87e-05 -0.0057 0.0004
(0.0007) (0.0017) (0.0008) (0.0020) (0.0010) (0.0036) (0.0086) (0.0007)
Home Affordability Index 0.0004*** 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0004** 0.0009* -0.0008 0.0004***
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0012) (0.0001)________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
R-Squared 0.40 0.16 0.28 0.13 0.26 0.17 0.04 0.36
Counties 189 189 187 187 189 189 187 189_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
a
 Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
b
 The table reports the coefficients from a regression of the black-white loan denial gap in each county on an index of the average 
prejudice of whites in those counties.  The dependent variable is the coefficient on the black indicator variable from separate linear 
probability models that control for the income and gender of the applicant, the gender of the co-applicant if applicable, the amount 
of the loan, the purpose  of the loan, the type of the property, information on occupancy and lien status, and census tract, lender, 
and year fixed effects; additionally, each linear probability model controls for the ratio of the loan amount to the median housing 
value of homes owned by members of the individual's racial group in the county of interest. The weights for each county are 
explained in the text.     
c
 Each regression shown also includes indicator variables representing whether the county is a central metropolitan county, outlying 
metropolitan county, or micropolitan county, with rural county being the omitted category.
Table A7 Conditional Correlations between Denial Gaps and Racial Prejudice, Seperately by Loan Type 
Prejudice Reweighted by the Propensity that Individual is in a Managerial Occupation in the Banking, Savings, and Loan Industry
d
 The average prejudice of whites in each state is calculated using the reweighted population, where the weights are proportional to 
the propensity that the individual is in a managerial occupation in the banking, savings, and loan industry.  More information is 
presented in the text.
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____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Conv. FHA
All All First Lien First Lien Conv. FHA Conv. Conv.
Conv. FHA Purchase Purchase Refinance Refinance HUD Non-HUD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________-
Avg. White Prejudice 0.0040* 0.0038 0.0068 0.0051 0.0061* 0.0259 0.0042 0.0035
(0.0017) (0.0050) (0.0055) (0.0113) (0.0025) (0.0171) (0.0037) (0.0018)
Fraction Black 0.0674 0.0511 0.0348 -0.0219 0.249 0.0786 0.2240 0.0852
(0.0779) (0.218) (0.229) (0.609) (0.128) (0.639) (0.1440) (0.0811)
Log Population Density -0.0014 -0.0008 0.0034 -0.0068 -0.0044 -0.0020 0.0072* -0.0023
(0.0015) (0.0057) (0.0047) (0.0109) (0.0024) (0.0139) (0.0033) (0.0017)
Bachelor's Degree Gap -0.0002 -0.0009 0.0004 -0.0009 -0.0005 -0.0046 -0.0001 -0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0016) (0.0003) (0.0030) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Unemployment Gap 0.0005 -0.0080* -0.0019 -0.0093 0.0001 -0.0118 -0.0006 0.0006
(0.0011) (0.0040) (0.0039) (0.0075) (0.0014) (0.0101) (0.0026) (0.0011)
Self-Employment Gap 0.0011 -0.0026 -0.0023 -0.0004 0.0006 -0.0050 0.0009 0.0005
(0.0011) (0.0046) (0.0034) (0.0056) (0.0015) (0.0153) (0.0016) (0.0012)
Percent Subprime Credit 0.0005 -0.0030 0.0003 -0.0050 0.0007 -0.0008 0.0001 0.0008*
(0.0003) (0.0016) (0.0010) (0.0029) (0.0005) (0.0035) (0.0007) (0.0004)
Percent Subprime Credit*Black -0.0011 0.0017 0.0009 0.0096 -0.0045 -0.0006 -0.0043 -0.0017
(0.0019) (0.0056) (0.0058) (0.0170) (0.0030) (0.0151) (0.0037) (0.0020)
Wealth Gap -0.0002 -6.48E-06 -0.0003 0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0015 0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0010) (0.0002) (0.0014) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Delinquency Gap 0.0003 0.0035 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0016 -0.0055 0.0006 -0.0001
(0.0008) (0.0028) (0.0023) (0.0060) (0.0010) (0.0063) (0.0017) (0.0008)
Owned Free/Clear Gap 0.0006* -0.0001 0.0007 0.0010 0.0001 -0.0019 2.42E-06 0.0006*
(0.0003) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0015) (0.0003) (0.0024) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Housing Costs Exceed 35% Gap -0.0006* 0.0004 -0.0019* -0.0004 -0.0006 0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0007*
(0.0003) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0016) (0.0004) (0.0027) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Home Affordability Index 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 3.19E-05 -0.0002 0.0001 4.14E-05
(3.06e-05) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (4.54e-05) (0.0003) (0.0001) (3.16e-05)________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
R-Squared 0.28 0.20 0.18 0.09 0.23 0.14 0.16 0.27
Counties 189 187 187 186 188 179 185 189_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
a
 Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table A8  Conditional Correlations between Racial Gaps in High-Priced Loan Prevalence and Racial Prejudice, 
Seperately by Loan Type
b
 The table reports the coefficients from a regression of the black-white gap in originated loans above the rate spread in each 
county on an index of the average prejudice of whites in those counties.  The dependent variable is the coefficient on the black 
indicator variable from separate linear probability models that control for the income and gender of the applicant, the gender of the 
co-applicant if applicable, the amount of the loan, the purpose of the loan, the type of the property, information on occupancy and 
lien status, and census tract, lender, and year fixed effects; additionally, each linear probability model controls for the ratio of the 
loan amount to the median housing value of homes owned by members of the individual's racial group in the county of interest. The 
weights for each county are explained in the text.     
c
 Each regression shown also includes indicator variables representing whether the county is a central metropolitan county, outlying 
metropolitan county, or micropolitan county, with rural county being the omitted category.
Page 53 of 57
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cus  Ruth.Harkin@glasgow.ac.uk
Urban Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
25 
 
Fig. A1 How Answers to GSS Prejudice Questions Change over Time 
 
 aFigure A1 shows how standardized responses to each GSS  
prejudice question have changed over time.  
bResponses are standardized by the mean and standard  
deviation of the first year that each question is asked. 
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Fig. A2 How the Average Prejudice Index has changed over Time 
across Census Divisions 
 
aFigure A2 shows how the average prejudice index has  
changed in each census division over time. 
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Fig. A3 The Average Prejudice Index across Census Divisions 
 
aFigure A3 shows the average prejudice index across each census  
division in the United States.  
bThe error band on each bar represents the 95% confidence 
interval on the estimate of average prejudice in that census division. 
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Fig. A4  Distribution of Prejudice among Managers in the Banking, Savings, and  
Loan Industry and Among the Entire White Population 
 
aThe red solid line shows the distribution of the individual-level prejudice 
index, as measured by the GSS, from 1993-2008.   
bThe blue dashed line shows the distribution of the individual-level 
prejudice index among the 171 individuals identified as working in 
managerial occupations in banking, savings, and loan organizations.   
cUsing the propensity score to weight all individuals by the probability that 
they work in a managerial occupations in a banking, savings, or loan 
organization based on age, years of education, gender, and all 4th-degree 
polynomials and interaction terms gives the distribution of prejudice shown 
by the dashed dotted gray line.    
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